The Battle of Maiwand
War: Second Afghan War
Date: 27th July 1880.
Place: West of Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan.
Combatants: British troops and Indian troops of the Bombay
Army against Afghan regular troops and tribesmen.
Generals: Brigadier General Burrows against Ayub Khan.
Size of the armies: 2,500 British and Indian troops with 6 RHA guns
and 6 smooth bore guns against 3,000 Afghan cavalry and 9,000
infantry with 6 batteries of artillery (36 guns).
Uniforms, arms and equipment:
The British and Indian forces were made up predominantly of
native Indian regiments from the three presidency armies: the
Bengal, Bombay and Madras armies with smaller regional forces such
as the Hyderabad contingent, and the newest, the powerful Punjab
Frontier Force. Indian regiments were brigaded with British
regiments for deployment in the field.
The Mutiny of 1857 brought great change to the Indian Army. Prior
to the Mutiny the old regiments of the presidencies were recruited
from the higher caste Brahmin Hindus and Muslims of the provinces of
Central and Eastern India, principally Oudh. 60 of the 90 infantry
regiments of the Bengal Army mutinied in 1857 and many more were
disbanded leaving few to survive in their pre-1857 form. A similar
proportion of Bengal Cavalry regiments disappeared.
The British Army overcame the mutineers with the assistance of
the few loyal regiments of the Bengal Army and the regiments of the
Bombay and Madras Presidencies, which on the whole did not mutiny.
But principally the British turned to the Gurkhas, Sikhs, Muslims of
the Punjab and Baluchistan and the Pathans of the North West
Frontier for the new regiments with which Delhi was recaptured and
the Mutiny suppressed.
After the Mutiny the British developed the concept of the
“Martial Races” of India. Certain Indian races were more suitable to
serve as soldiers, went the argument, and those were coincidentally
the races that had saved India for Britain. The Indian regiments
that invaded Afghanistan in 1878, although mostly from the Bengal
Army, were predominantly recruited from the “martial” races: Jats,
Sikhs, Muslim and Hindu Punjabis, Pathans, Baluchis and Gurkhas.
The Battle of Maiwand
Prior to the Mutiny each army had a full quota of field and horse
artillery batteries. The only Indian artillery units allowed to
exist after the Mutiny were the mountain batteries. All the horse,
field and siege batteries were from 1859 found by the British Royal
In 1878 the regiments were beginning to adopt “khaki” for field
operations. The technique for dying uniforms varied widely producing
a range of shades of khaki, from bottle green to a light brown drab.
As regulation uniforms were unsatisfactory for field conditions
in Afghanistan, the officers in most regiments improvised more
serviceable forms of clothing.
Every Indian regiment was commanded by British officers, in a
proportion of some 7 officers to 650 soldiers in the infantry. This
was an insufficient number for units in which all tactical decisions
of significance were taken by the British and was particularly
inadequate for less experienced units.
The British infantry carried the single shot, breech loading, .45
Martini-Henry rifle. The Indian regiments still used the Snider;
also a breech loading single shot rifle, but of older pattern and a
conversion of the obsolete muzzle loading Enfield weapon.
The cavalry were armed with sword, lance and carbines,
Martini-Henry for the British; Sniders for the Indian.
The British artillery, using a variety of guns, many smooth bored
muzzle loaders, was not as effective as it could have been if the
authorities had equipped it with the breech loading steel guns being
produced for European armies. Artillery support was frequently
ineffective and on occasions the Afghan artillery proved to be
better equipped than the British.
The army in India possessed no higher formations above the
regiment in times of peace other than the staffs of static
garrisons. There was no operational training for staff officers. On
the outbreak of war brigade and divisional staffs had to be formed
and learn by experience.
The British Army had in 1870 replaced long service with short
service for its soldiers. The system was not yet universally applied
so that some regiments in Afghanistan were short service and others
still manned by long service soldiers. The Indian regiments were all
manned by long service soldiers. The universal view seems to have
been that the short service regiments were weaker both in fighting
power and disease resistance than the long service.
Afghanistan showing all the battle sites of the Second Afghan
Ali Masjid, Peiwar Kotal, Charasiab and Kabul in the North East:
Ahmed Khel in the centre and Maiwand and Kandahar in the South
Winner: Resoundingly the Afghans.
Bombay Native Infantry
E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, now Maiwand Battery, 29th
Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery.
3rd Queen’s Own (Bombay Cavalry)
3rd Scinde Horse (Bombay Army)
HM 66th Foot (less 2 companies), from 1882 Royal Berkshire Regiment
and now the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment.
1st Grenadiers (Bombay Army)
30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob’s Rifles)
2nd Company Bombay Sappers and Miners (half company)
The 66th Foot in England before leaving for India and the Second
When in March 1879 Lieutenant General Sir Donald Stewart marched
north to Kabul with his division of Bengal Army and British
regiments, Kandahar was left to the Wali, its Afghan ruler, and a
replacement garrison of Bombay and British troops under Major
General Primrose. The Bengal regiments in the North of Afghanistan
were to withdraw to India during 1880 leaving only Kandahar Province
occupied by British and Indian troops.
In early 1880 the word reached Kandahar that the younger brother
of the deposed Ameer of Afghanistan Yakoub Khan, Ayub Khan, was
about to march with his army from Herat to Ghuznee, passing to the
North of Kandahar.
The Wali of Kandahar urged the British to intercept Ayub at
Girishk on the Helmond River to prevent him from raising the whole
countryside by his armed passage.
The Indian Government directed General Primrose to send a brigade to
Girishk and to bring regiments up from the reserve division as
Primrose appointed Brigadier General Burrows commander of the
field brigade with Brigadier General Nuttall commanding the cavalry.
Bombay Light Cavalry
The two cavalry regiments, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry and the 3rd
Scinde Horse marched out of Kandahar on 4th July 1880, followed by
the infantry and guns the next day.
Burrows force joined the Wali’s troops at Girishk only for the
Wali’s men to mutiny, many joining Ayub Khan’s army, the British
seizing their 6 antiquated smooth bore guns and forming a makeshift
battery manned by soldiers from the 66th Foot.
Late on 26th July 1880 Burrows received intelligence that Ayub’s
force was moving through the Malmund Pass and would reach the
village of Maiwand the next day, poised to march on Ghuznee. If
Burrows had marched on hearing the news he might have reached
Maiwand before Ayub. Instead the brigade marched in the early hours
of the next day, after a particularly trying time assembling its
A soldier of the 66th in Southern Afghanistan
As the British/Indian brigade approached Maiwand, Ayub’s army
could be seen marching across its front in the swirling dust storms
that swept the semi-desert area. Burrows formed the view that he
could reach Maiwand before the Afghans, urging his troops forward.
Burrows force passed the village of Mundabad and found it had
reached a substantial ravine 25 feet deep, running along its front.
Instead of taking up defensive positions at the ravine and in the
village, Burrows ordered his force across the ravine into the open
Ayub’s force comprised regular regiments from Kabul and Herat,
the Wali’s force which had deserted to him and tribesmen, making the
force up to around 12,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry. Burrows, by
contrast, had available for his line around 1,500 infantry and 350
cavalry, after telling off the necessary baggage guard.
The British guns crossed the ravine and continued forward to a
position where the Afghans were in range and opened fire.
The guns advanced considerably further than Burrow intended, the
infantry and cavalry hurrying up in support, the infantry in a line
with the 66th on the right, Jacob’s Rifles in the centre and the 1st
Grenadiers on the left.
The first phase of the battle comprised an artillery duel; the
Afghans out shooting the British, having a greater number of more
modern and heavier guns, including 6 state-of-the-art Armstrong
guns. The 1st Grenadiers and the cavalry suffered significant
casualties while the 66th and Jacob’s Rifles were able to find cover
from the bombardment.
Following the artillery exchange the Afghan infantry massed in
front of the British/Indian line for an assault. In a pre-emptive
move Burrows ordered the 1st Grenadiers to attack, but cancelled the
order even though the advance was making progress, fearing that the
Grenadiers were suffering excessive casualties from the Afghan
The advance across the open plain exposed the British/Indian left
flank; the threat from the enveloping Afghan cavalry causing Burrows
to move 2 companies of Jacobs Rifles to this flank and bolstering
them with two of the smooth bore guns on their left between the
Rifles and the troops of the baggage guard.
The British commanders had not realized that a hidden second
ravine ran beside the force’s other flank, joining the main ravine
in their right rear. The Afghans used this ravine during the battle
to infiltrate down the British/Indian right flank forcing the 66th
Foot to wheel to face the Afghans, until the regiment faced at right
angles to its neighbours, Jacob’s Rifles and the 1st Bombay
Saving the guns at Maiwand: E/B Battery Royal Horse Artillery
(now the Maiwand Battery).
Burrows’ force was now seriously strung out in a horse shoe
formation, exposed by the abortive advance of the infantry line, the
Afghan cavalry massing on the left flank and tribesmen and infantry
and guns infiltrating down the right flank by way of the subsidiary
In the early afternoon the two smoothbore guns ran out of
ammunition and withdrew, a move which severely unsettled the two
companies of Jacobs Rifles on the left flank, already suffering from
the artillery fire and the heat.
Gunners of the Royal Horse Artillery rescuing unhorsed colleagues
during the hectic retreat from the Afghan charge : Picture by Lady
With the departure of the smooth bores, the Afghan cavalry were
enabled to infiltrate behind the British/Indian left flank. Efforts
were made to counter this move with volley firing from the two
companies of Jacob’s Rifles, but the fire was largely ineffective,
the companies inexperienced and commanded by a newly joined officer
almost unknown to his soldiers.
On the British/Indian right flank, the Afghans continued to pass
down the subsidiary ravine. A move was made by troops of the Scind
Horse to attack these Afghans but the cavalry were recalled.
The 66th Foot at Maiwand
Ayub brought two of his guns down the subsidiary ravine and
commenced firing at short range, probably as short as 300 metres,
into the 1st Grenadiers.
In the early afternoon the guns ceased firing and
a mass of Afghan tribesman charged the British/Indian
infantry line. The two companies of Jacob’s Rifles on the
left fled leaving the flank of the 1st Grenadiers wholly
The Afghans cut down numbers of the Grenadiers,
the Indian soldiers apparently too exhausted and demoralized
The RHA guns positioned in the centre of the line fired a
last salvo and withdrew in haste, the Afghans reaching
within yards of the retreating guns and overwhelming the
left section. Seeing the guns go the remainder of Jacob’s
Rifles dissolved into the left wing of the 66th throwing the
right of the line into confusion.
Burrows sent Nuttall an order to charge the Afghans with his
cavalry in an attempt to restore the situation. Only 150 cavalry
could be assembled and these men charged halfheartedly at the
Afghans surrounding the Grenadiers and withdrew immediately after
the contact. Burrows rode about the field attempting to bring about
a further cavalry attack, but without success.
The British guns fired from a position to the rear of the
infantry and were then forced to withdraw across the main ravine,
coming into action several times from positions further back.
The last stand of the 66th Foot at Maiwand against the Afghans: the
Eleven (2 officers and 9 soldiers) sell their lives dearly outside
the village of Khig. Bobbie the dog can be seen at their feet.
The infantry fell back in two separate directions, the left wing
falling back towards Mundabad, the right, comprising the 66th, the
Sappers and Miners and most of the Grenadiers pushed towards the
village of Khig. Many of the Grenadiers were killed during the
retreat to the main ravine. The 66th, broken up by the collapse of
the two Indian regiments, fell back in small groups, fighting as
The 66th and the Grenadiers, pursued by large numbers of Afghans,
crossed the ravine into Khig, where around 100 officers and men made
a stand in a garden on the edge of the village. Overwhelmed, the
survivors withdrew through Khig with a second stand in a walled
garden. The final stand was made by 11 survivors of the 66th outside
the village, 2 officers and 9 soldiers.
The colossal memorial Lion in Forbury Gardens, Reading, commemorating the
Battle of Maiwand and the loss of the 66th Regiment
The remnants of the army was enabled to leave the field, the
right wing of the Afghan army held off by the surviving companies of
the Grenadiers, fighting until their ammunition was exhausted and
Stragglers of the 66th (Berkshires)
coming in by Harry Payne"
Burrows, the British commander, made his way through Khig, giving
up his horse to a wounded officer and being rescued by a warrant
officer of the Scind Horse, unaware that the remnant of his infantry
right wing was fighting to the death behind him.
The escaping British and Indian troops and camp followers
streamed up the road towards Kandahar, pursued by the Afghan
cavalry. During the disorganized retreat the pursuing Afghan cavalry
were held off by a squadron of the Scind Horse, the RHA battery and
the infantry from the baggage guard, although many stragglers were
caught and killed, particularly the wounded.
The Afghans on foot were distracted by the resistance in Khig and
by the Grenadiers and the opportunity to loot the British and Indian
The survivors of the brigade struggled on to Kandahar until they
were met by a small relieving force and the Afghan cavalry withdrew.
Casualties: The British and Indian force lost 21 officers
and 948 soldiers killed. 8 officers and 169 men were wounded. The
Grenadiers lost 64% of their strength and the 66th lost 62%,
including 12 officers. The cavalry losses were much smaller.
A reliable estimate of Afghan casualties is 3,000, reflecting the
desperate nature of much of the fighting.
E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery: 14 dead 13 wounded
3rd Queen’s Own (Bombay Cavalry) 27 dead 18 wounded
3rd Scinde Horse (Bombay Army) 15 dead 1 wounded
HM 66th Foot 286 dead 32 wounded
1st Grenadiers 366 dead 61 wounded
30th Bombay NI (Jacob’s Rifles) 241 dead 32 wounded
2nd Company Bombay Sappers and Miners 16 dead 6 wounded
Ex-private Nightingale of the 66th Foot shows his Afghan War
medal to children in 1930
Follow-up: The disastrous battle led Ayub Khan to abandon
his march on Ghuznee and lay siege to Kandahar instead. In spite of
the losses at Maiwand the British and Indian garrison was sufficient
to resist until the arrival of General Roberts with a force from
Kabul and the final battle of the war.
Royal Horse Artillery on exercise in England
Regimental anecdotes and traditions:
- Maiwand illustrated the knife edged nature of the battles in
Afghanistan: heavily outnumbered British and Indian forces winning
against much larger forces of Afghans, provided they were
experienced troops led by competent commanders. Although undoubtedly
brave, Burrows had not commanded in battle and had no experience of
commanding a mixed force of infantry, cavalry and guns. He permitted
his force to advance into an exposed position and failed to press
home the attack that might have retrieved the situation. At Ahmed
Khel, General Stewart came close to disaster at the hands of an
Afghan army with no guns. At Maiwand the Afghans had an overwhelming
advantage in gun numbers and quality and in Jacob’s Rifles, one
third of his infantry strength, Burrows had a seriously inadequate
unit, insufficiently officered with many of the men almost untrained
- Burrows failed to take into account the effect of the conditions.
The battle was fought on an exposed, dusty, dry plain in excessive
heat. Many of the soldiers had nothing to eat that day and the
supply of water failed early in the battle. The infiltration of the
Afghan cavalry between the fighting line and the baggage prevented
the supply of food, water and ammunition and the rescue of
casualties. The crucial smooth bore guns were permitted to run out
of ammunition and retire, fatally undermining the morale of the two
companies of Jacob’s Rifles occupying an important position on the
left of the infantry line.
- The experience of the 66th was dramatically expressed in Rudyard
Kipling’s poem “That Day”. McGonigall also committed the battle to
rhyme, perhaps less convincingly.
- The 66th were accompanied into battle by the dog Bobbie, owned by
Sergeant Kelly. Bobbie survived the final stand of the Eleven and
escaped to join the retreat, although wounded making her way to
Kandahar. On the regiment’s return to England Bobby was presented by
HM Queen Victoria at Osborne House with the Afghan War campaign
medal, along with other survivors of the battle.
Queen Victoria awarding the Afghan War Medal to Bobbie the dog,
survivor of the Battle of Maiwand, and other members of the 66th
Foot at Osborne House
- E Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery earned 2 Victoria
Crosses and 8 Distinguished Conduct Medals for its conduct during
the battle and the retreat. The battery was formally thanked by the
Viceroy on parade for its conduct.
- The Indian troops that fought all the successful battles of the
Second Afghan War in the North of the country were from the Bengal
Army. Maiwand was the first major engagement of the war fought by
the Bombay Army. The defeat with the near annihilation of three
infantry regiments brought heavy criticism on the Bombay Army.
- Maiwand caused a sensation in Britain and Europe. Two senior
officers from Burrows’ force were tried by court martial, but
acquitted. The battery commander of the smooth bore battery, Captain
Slade of the Royal Horse Artillery, received the CB for his conduct
in the battle.
- The conduct of individual British soldiers varied widely. The 66th
was considered a steady mainstream regiment of foot. The regiment
fought hard to repel the Afghans, several officers and soldiers
dying defending the regiment’s colours. The Afghans were impressed
by the courage of the men who fought it out in Khig and particularly
by the determination of the Eleven who shot down numbers of their
attackers and, when ammunition was exhausted, charged with the
bayonet to their deaths. During the retreat a number of British
soldiers became incapably drunk after raiding the officers’ stores
and had to be left behind to be slaughtered by the pursuing Afghans.
Sergeant Mullane of the RHA received the Victoria Cross for charging
recklessly in among the tribesmen overwhelming the guns and rescuing
a wounded gunner. Gunner Cullen won the Victoria Cross for his
conduct during the retreat.
- Sherlock Holmes’ amanuensis and friend, Dr Watson, received the
wound that caused him to leave India for 221B Baker Street while
serving as the surgeon of the 66th at Maiwand.
- The fallen of the 66th, the Berkshire Regiment, are commemorated
by an enormous stone lion in Forbury Park, Reading, the county town
of Berkshire; a dignified and sad memorial to Colonel Galbraith and
his men, engraved around the base with the names of the soldiers of
the 66th who fell at Maiwand.
- The stone lion should equally be considered a memorial to the
soldiers of the Royal Horse Artillery, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, the
3rd Scinde Horse, the 1st Grenadiers, the 30th Bombay NI, Jacob’s
Rifles, and the Bombay Sappers and Miners who died in the service of
the British Crown at Maiwand.
- The closing paragraph of “My God-Maiwand” (see below) reads: “He
(Brigadier-General Suleiman of the Afghan Army in 1970) laughed and
added ‘In any case, the threat of an armed peasantry in Afghanistan
is now so well appreciated abroad that not even the British will
ever dare invade us again!’
- “Good Luck to you. It’s all up with the Bally Old Berkshires”: this is what a soldier of the 66th called out to the departing E/B Battery as they galloped off leaving the 66th to be annihilated by the on-coming Afghans at the end of the battle; as recorded by Robert Baden-Powell in his book ‘Indian Memories’ after visiting the site of Maiwand at the end of the Second Afghan War.
- Baden-Powell also wrote that he made his visit to the battlefield with Sir Oliver St John who had fought at Maiwand. St John escaped after the battle with his Afghan orderly, only to find that his collie was missing. The Afghan orderly returned to the battle and retrieved the dog.
- Another Baden–Powell anecdote of the battle was about the Roman Catholic chaplain of the 66th who carried a water skin around aiding the wounded. As one of the gun teams of E/B Battery escaped from the battle they grabbed the chaplain and took him out with them.
That Day by Rudyard Kipling
(the poem Kipling wrote to commemorate the experience of the 66th
Foot at the Battle of Maiwand).
It got beyond all orders an' it got beyond all 'ope;
It got to shammin' wounded an' retirin' from the 'alt.
'Ole companies was lookin' for the nearest road to slope;
It were just a bloomin' knock-out -- an' our fault!
Now there ain't no chorus 'ere to give,
Nor there ain't no band to play;
An' I wish I was dead 'fore I done what I did,
Or seen what I seed that day!
We was sick o' bein' punished, an' we let 'em know it, too;
An' a company-commander up an' 'it us with a sword,
An' some one shouted "'Ook it!" an' it come to sove-ki-poo,
An' we chucked our rifles from us -- O my Gawd!
There was thirty dead an' wounded on the ground we wouldn't keep --
No, there wasn't more than twenty when the front begun to go;
But, Christ! along the line o' flight they cut us up like sheep,
An' that was all we gained by doin' so.
I 'eard the knives be'ind me, but I dursn't face my man,
Nor I don't know where I went to, 'cause I didn't 'alt to see,
Till I 'eard a beggar squealin' out for quarter as 'e ran,
An' I thought I knew the voice an' -- it was me!
We was 'idin' under bedsteads more than 'arf a march away;
We was lyin' up like rabbits all about the countryside;
An' the major cursed 'is Maker 'cause 'e lived to see that day,
An' the colonel broke 'is sword acrost, an' cried.
We was rotten 'fore we started -- we was never disciplined;
We made it out a favour if an order was obeyed;
Yes, every little drummer 'ad 'is rights an' wrongs to mind,
So we had to pay for teachin' -- an' we paid!
The papers 'id it 'andsome, but you know the Army knows;
We was put to groomin' camels till the regiments withdrew,
An' they gave us each a medal for subduin' England's foes,
An' I 'ope you like my song -- because it's true!
An' there ain't no chorus 'ere to give,
Nor there ain't no band to play;
But I wish I was dead 'fore I done what I did,
Or seen what I seed that day!
My God-Maiwand by Maxwell: an exhaustive authoritative
account of the battle by a Gunner Officer.
The Road to
Kabul; the Second Afghan War 1878 to 1881 by Brian Robson.
Recent British Battles by Grant.
The Afghan War medal issued to a trooper in the 10th
Hussars with the clasp Ali Masjid. With thanks to Historik
Orders of Greenwich, Connecticut, USA (right)
The Kabul and Kandahar Star, issued to those regiments that
fought at Kabul, took part in General Roberts’ march to
Kandahar and in the battle at Kandahar. With thanks to
Historik Orders of Greenwich, Conn. USA. (left)